Abstract: The following introduces a special issue of the Journal of Folklore Research (49/2, 2012) that focuses on situations in which individuals and the vernaculars associated with them are stigmatized. Authors in the special issue explore issues of reflexivity, representation, and 'stigma veneration' as they emerged during research on type 2 diabetes, accounts of tobacco farming, chaotic narratives of trauma, and the quest for political asylum. Here, the issue's guest editors introduce concerns about stigma, vernacularity, tellability, visibility, and valuation. A number of methodological issues arise as researchers struggle to hear what isn't voiced and attempt to determine what can't be said when writing about stigmatized groups or topics.
In a moving and now classic 1989 reconsideration of his earlier work on the Ilongot headhunters of Luzon, Philippines, anthropologist Renato Rosaldo described his inability to grasp the rage that would compel someone to cut off a human head. The Ilongot spoke of severing and tossing a victim's head away as an act that enabled the headhunter to discard the anger that arises from bereavement. In "Grief and a Headhunter's Rage," Rosaldo wrote of his inability to understand grief and anger so powerful that it would lead to such brutal action-until he experienced the sudden tragic loss of his wife Michelle in 1981, when during a fieldwork trip in the Philippines she lost her footing and fell to her death. Rosaldo characterizes his journal entries following Michelle's death by saying they "reflect more broadly on death and rage and headhunting by speaking of my 'wish for the Ilongot solution '" (1993, 11) . He continues, "They are much more in touch with reality than Christians" (11). In a subsequent reflection, Rosaldo notes:
One burden of this introduction concerns the claim that it took some fourteen years for me to grasp what Ilongots had told me about grief, rage, and headhunting. During all those years I was not yet in a position to comprehend the force of anger possible in bereavement, and now I am. Introducing myself into this account requires a certain hesitation both because of the discipline's taboo and because of its increasingly frequent violation by essays laced with trendy amalgams of continental philosophy and autobiographical snippets. (2004, 170) Rosaldo's words render visible the deep connections among stigma, cultural vernaculars, the position of researchers, and the untellable, unwriteable, and unspeakable. Conducting research on a stigmatized, brutally violent cultural act (understood differently by those who engage in its performance), studying that performance from a position of distance and then from a position too close, Rosaldo makes tellable things that resist representation, resist reading, and resist hearing. He recognizes the stigma of his own act of understanding and making visible, in a deep and close way, the motives of those labeled as barbaric, motives and samenesses preferred invisible in the face of desired difference and distance. Rosaldo's newfound reflexive understanding of angry horrific brutality in fact engages a double stigma, one for the act practiced by the Ilongot, and another for his own ability to understand and perhaps even sympathize. Rosaldo's piece was risky, putting words (and empathetic words at that) to an act so heinous that to say it is stigmatized seems wrong, that is, the labeling, the othering, and the distancing appear self-evident. Furthermore, Rosaldo broke the "us" and "them" barrier, and, as could be expected, was amply criticized for doing so.
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Over the last five years a number of linked panels at the American Folklore Society Meetings have been organized under the title "The Stigmatized Vernacular." This effort has explored double stigmas: those situations where not only are individuals stigmatized, but so are the vernaculars associated with them. As part of this multi-layered conversation about stigma, this special issue discusses the relationship between the stigmatized individual and our role as researchers. Here, we address our own perspectives as researchers struggling with stigma issues and tellability, as well as scholarly reflexive concerns dealing with what can't be said when working with stigmatized groups or topics.
This work builds on Erving Goffman's concept of stigma and the management of spoiled identities (1963); on Harvey Sacks's (1992) and William Labov's (1967) notions of tellability and its counterpart, untellability; and on decades of work on reflexivity and political representation. It builds also on Amy Shuman's notion that stigma is a form of hypervisibility that obscures other experiences and on Diane Goldstein's (2009) work on the vernacular politics of narrative. Focusing on stigma, the papers in this issue discuss the institutional constraints researchers faced during the fieldwork and writing processes; authors explore issues of reflexivity, representation, and 'stigma veneration' as they emerged during research on type 2 diabetes, accounts of tobacco farming, the sometimes chaotic untellable narratives of trauma, and the quest for political asylum.
All four papers demonstrate how folklore research contributes to understanding the cultural politics of stigma, that is, not only what is stigmatized by different groups, but also which resources people employ to manage the discrimination, prejudice, or oppression that can result from stigma. Goffman distinguished between the discredited, that is, individuals recognized as belonging (sometimes by association only) to a stigmatized group, and the discreditable, that is, individuals who are vulnerable to stigmatization. Discreditable is an especially interesting cultural category because it implies the possibility that someone can 'pass' as long as his or her stigma is not recognized or revealed; in this sense, stigma can involve a process of discovery. The maintenance of such a category involves processes of surveillance, often by informal gatekeepers.
The Stigmatized Vernacular
Goffman's foundational work Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (1963) has inspired nearly five decades of elaboration and ethnographic illustration of stigma's negative impact in the lives of individuals affected by everything from unemployment and marginalized occupations to race and religion, disease and disability, sexual practice and sexual orientation. Over the years, notions of stigma have varied somewhat from Goffman's definition; he saw stigma as an attribute that is "deeply discrediting" and that reduces the bearer "from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one" (3). As social science writing on stigma has developed over the years, it has been most elaborated in the field of social psychology by researchers who have focused predominantly on the construction of stigma-related cognitive categories (Link and Phelan 2001) . One of the significant critiques of these studies is that they tend to be uninformed by the lived experience of those who find themselves affected by stigma. In writing about epilepsy, for example, Joseph Schneider argues that most able-bodied experts give priority to "scientific theories and research techniques rather than to the words and perceptions of the people they study" (1988, 64) .
Such a comment is a call to arms for folklorists, entrenched as we are in the words and experiences of the people with whom we work. Our disciplinary focus positions us well to concentrate on the vernacular experience of the stigmatized, but it also propels us toward analysis of the performance of stigma, the process of stigmatization, and the political representation of stigmatized populations. These perspectives come to the fore in the articles that follow, as does the multi-layered nature of stigma-its ability to reproduce, overlap, and spread, not just in terms of replication, but also in terms of the ethnographer's ability to apprehend it and her ability to research and write about it. The phrase the stigmatized vernacular is intended to capture not only the emic experience of stigmatization, but also the contagion of stigma-the way it spills over beyond the topic into the means of articulation.
Unlike some of the other terms used for folklore-for example, popular antiquities or local cultural productions-the term vernacular carries with it the possibility of stigma, as, for example, when that term is used to describe a non-standard language. Dell Hymes argued vehemently against the stigma attached to non-standard languages and for recognition of what he called language equality, especially the value of the vernacular (1992, 1). Henry Glassie goes further in his attempts to valorize the vernacular:
[W]e call buildings "vernacular" because they embody values alien to those cherished in the academy. When we called buildings "folk," the implication was that they countered in commonness and tradition the pretense and progress that dominate simple academic schemes. . . . The study of vernacular architecture, through its urge toward the comprehensive, accommodates cultural diversity. It welcomes the neglected into study in order to acknowledge the reality of difference and conflict. (2000, 20) For both Hymes and Glassie, the vernacular references diversity; both scholars promote the vernacular as part of a critique of the stigma of difference. Not all vernaculars are stigmatized, and not all stigmatizing practices are directed at the ordinary, everyday, or folk (to suggest some apparently synonymous concepts). Rather than point to word origins-a move that can claim a deceptive empiricism if the history of a word's unfolding meanings is ignored-we are interested in the kinds of contrasts the term vernacular has served. The Latin vernaculum distinguished between the "homebred, homespun, homegrown, homemade" and "things obtained in formal exchange. The child of one's slave and of one's wife, the donkey born of one's own beast, were vernacular beings, as was the staple that came from the gardens or commons" (Illich 1980, 85) .
In folklore research, the concept of the vernacular has been applied not only to language and architecture, but also to music. Thus the vernacular is interestingly contrasted with the term creole, which originally designated a European born in Latin America (Cara 2003) . Unlike creole, which describes the emergence of new, combined, musical forms (as well as cultural practices and people), vernacular can imply a claim to indigeneity. For the most part, at least when used by Hymes and Glassie, vernacular was intended to replace other, more stigmatizing terms and phrases, such as low culture, primitive, or even folk itself. In suggesting the category of 'stigmatized vernacular,' we intend to open up questions regarding indigeneity, cultural/racial mixing, high and low, expert and lay knowledge-contested conceptualizations that we suggest are central to folkloristics.
The stigmatized vernacular is dialectically associated with the venerated vernacular. Several scholars have offered accounts of how the vernacular becomes associated with the stigmatized. Ivan Illich (1980) argues that every attempt to substitute a universal commodity for a vernacular value has led not to equality, but to a hierarchical modernization of poverty. Cindy Patton (1992) argues that the appropriation of vernaculars always ends in embarrassment because the appropriator never knows all the rules for usage and the new context never fits exactly. James C. Scott (2009) describes borrowed, appropriated, and commodified vernaculars-that is, vernaculars detached from context-as "vernaculars cross-dressing or dressed up to travel." Each of these theorists is proposing that value gets reconfigured when things are taken out of context. These observations provide a good starting point for considering the relationship between vernacularity and value. However, they assume a point 'before' things are borrowed or taken out of context, and by implication also assume that visibility/ tellability are less disturbed (or not disturbed at all) in this previous moment.
We suggest that folkloristics, the field most engaged with the positive values of the vernacular, is in a good position to rethink the relationship between stigma and vernacularity. The papers that follow consider several possible configurations of stigma and vernacular. Ann Ferrell considers the stigmatized vernacular in relation to discourses of heritage. She discusses how some narratives about tobacco farming are more tellable than others in particular contexts, especially outside the context of the farmers' own discussions. She points out that the economic and symbolic discourses about tobacco have been discursively separated, such that, for example, tobacco as heritage becomes less stigmatized in comparison to tobacco growing as an ongoing way of life. To some extent, then, stigma erases one vernacular in favor of another.
Whereas Ferrell's discussion of stigmatized tobacco farmers describes a vernacular practice that has changed in value to outsiders, Sheila Bock discusses how the stigma associated with type 2 diabetes is enacted, rejected, and/or promoted in everyday (vernacular) conversations and performances of self. As she demonstrates, vernacular cultural discourses keep stigmas in place. Here the vernacular can be aligned with the ordinary knowledge of people in their everyday lives in contrast to medical knowledge. It is fascinating to consider how medical and vernacular discourses both intersect and compete for meaning.
Diane Goldstein explores the representational politics surrounding untellability and stigma, especially in those situations in which trauma or mental and physical challenges result in 'chaotic narratives' that only serve to further stigmatize individuals. Goldstein focuses on the experience, the content, and the context of traumatic untellability in order to re-examine issues related to scholarly choices of speaking for, about, or without.
Amy Shuman and Carol Bohmer describe political asylum applicants as caught between discourses of veneration (that honor survivors of horrible situations) and discourses of repudiation (that regard applicants through a lens of suspicion). The narratives told by asylum seekers articulate one form of the stigmatized vernacular. Shuman and Bohmer discuss how vastly different, unfamiliar, and terrifying situations are multiply stigmatized as not only barbaric but also as not-credible, as beyond the pale of the possible, as hypervisible but not recognizable. They, like the other authors of this volume, suggest an important link between the stigmatized vernacular and the tellable (and recognizable).
Tellability, the Untellable, and Reflexivity
The notion of tellability comes to us from the important narrative writings of William Labov (1972) and Harvey Sacks ([1974] 1989, 1992) . Later joined by Livya Polanyi (1979), Shuman (1986) , Monika Fludernik (1996) , Elinor Ochs and Lisa Capps (2001), Neal Norrick (2005) , and others, Labov and Sacks argued that reportability or tellability is the crucial requirement for competent narration. It is what allows a narrator to defend his or her story as relevant and newsworthy-to get and hold the floor and escape censure at its conclusion (Polanyi 1981) . Tellability addresses audience expectations, newsworthiness, uniqueness, relevance, importance, and humor but also-and perhaps just as centrally-appropriateness, contextualization, negotiation, mediation, and entitlement. As Labov notes, there is no absolute standard of inherent tellability-in appropriate circumstances, even that which is trite or commonplace can be told with power and affect. But the reverse is also true. As Norrick writes, Tellers do not report just any accident; they report "the most gosh awful wreck" they have ever seen, as in Sacks' story "Down to Ventura." . . . Such claims for tellability typically appear in the preface to a story, and tellers typically come back to the newsworthiness at the end, picking up a phrase from the preface, which refers to the news at its beginning: "It wasn't in the paper last night. I looked." A story about "the most gosh-awful wreck on the Ventura Freeway" may be tellable as news, but at some point the gruesome details of the wreck with the dead and injured, the blood and guts goes beyond the tellable into areas of the no longer tellable. (2005, 324) Donna Wyckoff (1996), Elaine Lawless (2001) , Shuman (1986 Shuman ( , 2006 , Goldstein (2009), Shuman and Carol Bohmer (2004) , and others have explored the nature of untell able narratives in the context of sexual abuse, violence, and political unrest, and similar notions of narrative management in the face of social stigma have been discussed by David Hufford (1976 ), Lauri Honko (1964 ), Christine Cartwright (1982 , Gillian Bennett (1987) , and Goldstein (1991) in relation to the expression of personal supernatural experiences. These works focus on the kinds of experiences that can or cannot be talked about in particular contexts, the factors that limit such narrating, and the risk-taking inherent in the telling of certain types of personal narratives. Stories become untellable because the content defies articulation, the rules of appropriateness outweigh the import of content, the narrator is constrained by issues of entitlement and storytelling rights, or the space the narratives would normally inhabit is understood by the narrator as somehow unsafe. Narrative telling can be risky business, not just in terms of the personal discursive risk for the tale teller, but also as narration reflects on, and acts upon, others potentially implicated in narrative events.
In particular, untellable narratives are connected to what bell hooks describes as questions about who is "worthy to speak and be heard" (1992, 176) . As many scholars have noted, narrative is one means for individuals to negotiate and produce identities, sometimes in relation to otherwise stigmatizing characterizations (Bamberg 1997; Georgakopoulou 2002; Mishler 2006) . Narrators align themselves, the characters in the taleworld, and the storyrealm (Young 1987) in order to produce a particular stance. Along these lines, Bamberg's three elements of positioning (how characters are positioned in relation to events, in relation to the audience, and in relation to themselves) could be applied to stigma-for example, to consider how particular practices or events are stigmatized, how narrative is used to persuade listeners to accept or reject particular characters and their practices, and how people describe themselves and others-whether as protagonist or antagonist, blameworthy or innocent, or credible or disbelieved (1997, 337) . The negotiation of what is tellable or untellable relies in part on these alignments. As Harold Garfinkel has obser ved, stigma and its opposite-that which is considered 'normal'-always invoke a relationship between the tellable and the untellable ([1967] 1984, 181) .
Stigma as Hypervisibility
Goffman's work on stigma explored the multiple possibilities and consequences of visibility, invisibility, tellability, untellability, passing, and being exposed/exposing oneself. He dismantled the binaries of tellable/untellable or visible/invisible by demonstrating that these categories are situational and interactive. Visibility is produced by interactions in which semiotic codes enable saliency, that is, identify particular features as marked. The categories of marked and unmarked can be relatively value-neutral in language and can be used to point out differences that are not necessarily accompanied by stigma. For example, tea, the unmarked variety, can refer to sweetened ice tea in South Carolina and unsweetened hot tea in Boston. As Frantz Fanon argued, the category 'white' is anything but neutral, and in purporting to be an unmarked category, it stigmatizes the marked, 'black' skin (see Silverman 1996) . Kaja Silverman argues, "The black subject described by Fanon is not only in 'combat' with the image through which he is 'photographed' by the seemingly white gaze but is also irresistibly drawn to the 'mirror' of an ideal 'whiteness'" (1996, 29) . In more recent work, Georgios Anagnostu discusses the role of whiteness in the use of the category 'model minority,' a category that offers the removal of stigma to those few who get a high grade on what Micaela di Leonardo (1998, 70) calls an "ethnic report card: the positive valuation and public flaunting of those traits that are seen as leading to mobility" (Anagnostu 2009, 9) .
The "public flaunting" of cultural practices, whether by a group itself or by others who appropriate and recontextualize practices, creates hypervisibility in contrast but always connected to invisibility. Invisibility and hypervisibility both reference asymmetrical power relations. For example, Charles Briggs and Clara Mantini-Briggs discuss how the visibility/invisibility/hypervisibility of cholera participates in other asymmetries, in which two groups (in their case, creole and indigenous groups) are represented as separate but equal, but the discourse is actually "a cover for asymmetrical relationships, where one group is constructed as the complete version and the other is a partial and defective copy" (2003, 251) . (An alternative reading is that one group is authentic and the other is inauthentic.)
In other words, stigma often depends on discourses that explicitly promote difference and implicitly contain hierarchies of value. Authenticity is one of those discourses, providing value but often at the cost of stigma. Notably, Theodor Adorno suggested, " [A] nything that does not wish to wither should rather take on itself the stigma of the inauthentic" (in Jay 2006, 22) . Along those lines, folkloristics has had a paradigm shift in recent decades, from an effort to find the authentic folk to an interest in identifying the conditions in which authenticity is produced (Bendix 1997; Kirshenblatt-Gimblett 1998) . Folklorists today recognize that the field's earlier preoccupation with finding the unmarked, untarnished folk actually marked those people as exotic others. Today, in explorations of heritage culture (e.g., Ferrell, this volume), folklorists are exploring what it might mean to take on "the stigma of the inauthentic." That process of inquiry begins by asking how cultural practices are valued and disvalued, which dimensions of humanity are unmarked, and which are marked.
A next step would be to ask about the necessity of the relationship between visibility/invisibility and tellability/untellability. Goffman's work calls attention to the relationship between visibility and tellability without arguing that they are inextricably linked. For example, he undertakes elaborate inquiries about both stigma and alignment, but he does not connect the two issues. He considers stigma as a problem of tellability/untellability, and he considers how speakers take up a particular alignment, or stance, with regard to each other, but he does not consider how alignment might produce, resist, enable, or confront stigma. In the papers in this volume, we ask whether or not we should, as Peggy Phelan suggests, take "as axiomatic the link between the image and the word, that what one can see is in every way related to what one can say" (1993, 2) .
The papers in this volume also take into consideration methodological issues of fieldwork, especially the problem of accurately representing contingent truths. Václav Havel wrote that truth "is not simply what you think it is; it is also the circumstances in which it is said, and to whom, why, and how it is said" (1990, 67) . This does not mean that the truth is up for grabs, but rather that it must be pinned down, and it does not remain pinned down but rather requires constant attention to context. This fundamental premise of the ethnography of communication as conceived by Dell Hymes has particular resonance for considering not just the varieties (vernacularity) of everyday communication and performance, but also how stigma is produced by the constraints of what gets told, by whom, to whom, and about whom.
In writing about the stigmatized vernacular, the authors of these essays have considered those constraints not only as objects of study, but also as questions of ethics and methodology. In each essay, the people discussed are included in the intended audience; further, each author is in conversation with the relevant policymakers, lawyers, public health professionals, and advocates. If the language of the essays isn't entirely familiar to folklorists, that may be because we see our task as opening a conversation broader than the discipline. We hope to be making a contribution to folkloristics, but we are not claiming that this conversation belongs only to us.
To return to Rosaldo's example, we are reminded that although our goal may be mutual understanding, and although our project might be an effort to understand how gaps in understanding stigmatized vernaculars occur, not all understandings are tellable without cost. Although untellability has begun to be explored in narrative research, it has not generally been applied to our thinking about reflexive or auto-ethnography-to the storytelling rights of ethnographers, the things we see, experiences that defy articulation, our unsafe spaces. Our effort, in the pages that follow, is to unpack the interstitial gaps that form in the representational narratives surrounding stigma, and, like Rosaldo, to venture into those spaces of silence and identify the conditions in which speaking is or is not possible.
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